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NOTES
Transferring and Enjoining Suits
Under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act
THE VENUE provision' of the Federal Employers' Liability Act has been
subjected to both judicial and Congressional modification since its enact-
ment. Prior to its enactment, a plaintiff was often forced to bring suit
in an inconvenient forum, since proper venue could only be laid in the
state or federal district in which the defendant resided. 2 In many in-
stances this required a plaintiff to travel long distances in order to main-
tain his action. The resultant inequity was dear. A heavy burden and
expense in transportation of witnesses and evidence was imposed upon
the injured party. The purpose of the special venue provision of the
FELA, therefore, was to provide the plaintiff with a larger number of
forums in which proper venue could be laid.
It appears evident from the Supreme Court cases and Congressional
action following the enactment of the provision, however, that the balance
"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United
States, in the district of the residence of defendant, or in which the cause of action
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing
such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter
shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and no case arising
under this chapter and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be
removed to any court of the United States." 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 36
STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1946).
'Cound v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 173 Fed. 527 (W.D. Tex. 1909).
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of the equities, theretofore strongly in favor of the defendant railroads,
was shifted in favor of the plaintiff. It is the purpose of this article to
review the action taken by Congress and the Supreme Court in order to
evaluate the soundness of the present law on this subject.
In ordinary state actions, a defendant may assert the inequity of the
plaintiffs choice, of forum as a procedural defense. Those state courts
in which the doctine of forum non conveniens has been adopted can, in
their discretion, dismiss the suit upon a finding that the cost of defend-
ing the action was unnecessarily burdensome, or that the plaintiff's choice
of forum was made for the purpose of harassing the defendant.3 A sec-
ond remedial measure is also available to a defendant. A court having
in personam jurisdiction can, upon the same ground of oppressiveness,
enjoin a plaintiff from continuing his action.' By either of these meth-
ods the plaintiff who is seeking an advantageous bargaining position by
attempting to force suit upon the defendant in an inconvenient forum can
be restrained.5
Constitutional limitations restrict the exercise of these powers by a
state court. The privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Con-
stitution' insures that a state will not refuse a non-citizen access to its
courts in a case in which a citizen would have been allowed to bring
suit.7
The Federal courts also early applied the equitable measures of in-
junction and forum non conveniens in cases in admiralty," and in 1947
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was applied in federal courts for
the first time in an ordinary suit at law for damages. In Galf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert," the Supreme Court held that since the federal district court
of New York was justified in finding that an unreasonable burden would
be placed upon the defendant by requiring him to defend the action in
New York, that court did not err in dismissing the action. The reasoning
of the court in this case appears sound; a defendant should not be com-
pelled to sustain an undue financial burden by transporting witnesses and
'Collard v. Beach, 81 N.Y. Supp. 619 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1903).
4New York, C. &S.L. R.R v. Matzinger, 136 Ohio S. 271, 25 N.E.2d 349 (1940).
'It is dear, however, that the courts require a substantial amount of evidence before
affording the relief requested by a purportedly harassed defendant. ".... Unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 Sup. Ct. 839,
843 (1947); accord, Cox v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 F. Supp. 278 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
"The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several states." U.S. CONST. Art. IV, 5 2.
7Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 355 (1929).
'Canada Malting Company, Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 52 Sup.
Ct. 413 (1932).
'330 U.S. 501, 67 Sup. Ct. 839 (1947).
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records to a distant place of trial, or, in the alternative, to accept an un-
desirable settlement.
However, in federal statutory actions where a special venue provision
had been prescribed, a federal court could not dismiss an action on the
ground of forum non conveniens. 10 Nor would an injunction lie against
a plaintiff whose venue had been properly laid." The FELA was in-
cluded among this class of actions.
Early cases appeared to construe the FELA as conferring upon the
plaintiff an absolute right to bring suit in any federal district or state in
which the defendant resided or the accident occurred or in which the
defendant was doing business at the time of commencement of the action.
A defendant could therefore not contest the plaintiff's choice of forum
on the ground that the burden and expense of defending the suit in this
court heavily outweighed the advantage, if any, which was gained by the
plaintiff in making his selection. In the case of Baltimore & 0. R.R. v.
Kepner,12 the defendant, a resident of Ohio, brought suit in a federal
district court of New York. The alleged wrong upon which the action
was based occurred in Ohio. The Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed a decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio that the plaintiff could
not enjoin the FELA action in New York, on the ground that the de-
fendant was privileged to bring suit in any court in which proper venue
could be laid. The right conferred by the venue provision was said to
be absolute. This same result was reached in Miles v. Illinois Cent.
R.R.,J 3 in which the defendant in the FELA action sought to enjoin the
plaintiff from bringing suit in a Tennessee state court.
The question of whether or not a state court could dismiss the suit
on the ground that the plaintiff, by his choice of forum, was harassing
the defendant, had not been dearly answered. In Mondou v. New York,
N. H. & H. R.R.,' 4 the Supreme Court decided that a Connecticut court
was not justified in dismissing an FELA action on the ground that it was
against the public policy of the state and that it was inconvenient and
confusing for that state to apply standards of right established by Con-
gress which conflicted with the standards established by that state for
the same class of actions. In refusing to allow Connecticut to dismiss on
these grounds, the Supreme Court said: "We conclude that rights arising
under the act in question may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of
" Connelly v. Central R.R., 238 Fed. 932 (S.D. New York 1916).
"Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 62 Sup. Ct. 827 (1942); Baltimore &
0. R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 Sup. Ct. 6 (1941); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Vigor, 90 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1937), ccrt. denied, 302 U.S. 705, 58 Sup. Ct. 25 (1937).
"314 U.S. 44, 62 Sup. Ct 6 (1941).
u 315 U.S. 698, 62 Sup. Ct. 827 (1942).
"'223 U.S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912).
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the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate
to the occasion."'15 This statement by the court was not given a uniform
interpretation by the state courts, however, some holding that the prohi-
bition against dismissal merely prevented discrimination by a state court
against an action provided for by Congress,1" while others held that the
Mondou case imposed an absolute prohibition, and hence the state court
could not on any grounds dismiss an BELA action since it was obliged to
hear the case regardless of the inequity of the plaintiff's choice of
forum.17
Thus, although a defendant could resist the imposition of a burden-
some forum in those cases not governed by the FELA or other statutes
containing special venue provisions, he was required to defend a suit
where there was a special venue provision regardless of the cost which
would necessarily have to be incurred. The obvious result was that the
plaintiff seeking a remedy for his injury was enabled to choose so in-
convenient a forum as to force upon the defendant an inamicable settle-
ment, or to bring suit in a forum traditionally accustomed to awarding
high damages.' 8
Cognizant of these facts, Congress enacted the federal transfer stat-
ute.'9 This statute gave to federal district courts the discretionary power
to transfer any civil action, in the interests of justice and for the conven-
ience of the parties, to any other district where it might have been
brought. Although it was argued that the phrase "any civil action" did
not include those actions for which special venue provisions had been
prescribed, the Supreme Court, following the express language of the
statute, held it to be applicable to such actions.20
The effect of the transfer statute on this class of actions is illustrated
by the case of United States v. Nat. City Lines, Inc., which was brought
to the Supreme Court both before2 ' and after22 passage of the statute. In
'Id. at 59, 32 Sup. Ct. at 179. Italics added.
" Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508 (1927).
' Leet v. Union P. R.R., 25 Cal.2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944).
This practice of "shopping" for a forum became prevalent and was highly criticized.
See Gay, Bill to Curb "Shopping" for Forums ii Urged, 33 A.BA.J. 659 (1947).
" "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (Supp. 1948).
"U.S. v. Nat. City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 69 Sup. Ct. 955 (1949); Kilpatrick v.
Texas & P. Ry., 337 U.S. 75, 69 Sup, Ct 953 (1949); Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55,
69 Sup. Ct. 944 (1949); accord, Hayes v. Chicago, RLI. & P. R.., 79 F. Supp. 821
(D. Minn. 1948); Nunn v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R.R., 80 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.
N.Y. 1948).
't334 U.S. 573, 68 Sup. Ct. 1169 (1948).
'337 U.S. 78, 69 Sup. Ct. 955 (1949).
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this case suit was brought by the government to enjoin the alleged monop-
olistic practices of the defendant. Proper venue was laid in accordance
with the provisions of the Clayton Act,23 which are similar to those of
the FELA and have been treated alike as special venue provisions. In
its initial appearance before the district court for the southern district of
California, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
selected forum was inconvenient and that the case could more easily be
heard by a district court of Illinois. The trial court granted the motion
and dismissed the action without prejudice to the government to institute
suit in a more convenient forum. A direct appeal was made to the Su-
preme Court. As in the Miles and Kepner cases, the court held that the
plaintiff was given a choice of forum as a matter of right, and that a de-
fendant could not defeat this choice by a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the selected forum was inconvenient, or that the plaintiff's choice
was vexatious, oppressive or harassing. After the effective date of the
transfer statute,24 the defendant again filed a motion for transfer in the
California district court on the same ground, and the motion was again
granted by that court. On this appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision, holding that the transfer statute was applicable to antitrust suits
and, by way of dictum, to actions brought under the FELA as welL
The view expressed in this dictum was confirmed by the Court in
the later case of Ex Parte Collett.25 This case was an action in mandamus
and prohibition, in which the relator alleged that the Illinois court which
effected the transfer of an FELA action had exceeded its authority and
that the Kentucky court to which the action had been transferred had no
jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court held that "any civil
action" within the meaning of the statute included actions brought under
the FELA, and that the district court had not exceeded its authority by
transferring the suit.
Hence, whereas a defendant could not successfully effect a transfer to
a more convenient forum under any circumstances in an action under the
FELA prior to the endctment of the transfer statute, after its enactment
the inequity of the imposition of a burdensome forum upon the defendant
could be urged, and a federal district court was empowered to effect a
transfer in its discretion.
The question as to whether a state court could dismiss an FELA suit
on the ground of forum non conveniens when a part of its local law, here-
"Any suit, action, or proceeding under the anti-trust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases
may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be
found." 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1946).
'Sept. 1, 1948.
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tofore unsettled in view of the Mondou case,2 6 was answered by the Su-
preme Court in Missouri ex el. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield.= A Missouri
trial court, considering themselves bound by the strong language of the
Miles and Kepner cases, refused to dismiss an FELA action. On certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that the FELA had
never imposed a restriction upon the application of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens by a state court if the doctrine was a part of its local law.
A state court could have dismissed a suit even prior to passage of the
transfer statute, which is directed only to federal district courts, and of
course could dismiss it after passage of the statute.
It should be emphasized at this point that the venue provision of the
FELA still allows a plaintiff bringing suit thereunder to have a choice of
forums in any state or federal district in which the defendant resides or
is doing business or in which the cause of action arose. Because of the
transfer statute, however, his choice is subject to the discretionary power
of the court to transfer or dismiss the case in those instances where that
choice of forum is vexatious, harassing, or oppressive to the defendant.
The closely allied question of whether a state court having in per-
sonam jurisdiction can enjoin the plaintiff from bringing suit in the
court of a foreign jurisdiction on these grounds was raised recently in
Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.281 The plaintiff in this case sought to
enjoin an action brought by the defendant under the FELA in an Alabama
state court. The injunction proceeding was instituted in Georgia, where
both plaintiff and defendant resided and where all events involved in the
litigation had occurred. The Georgia trial court sustained the defend-
ants demurrer, and this ruling was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Georgia. After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the Georgia Supreme Court, refusing to recognize the
right of the Georgia court to grant the injunction, and holding that the
venue provision of the FELA displaced the traditional power of state
courts to enjoin their citizens from bringing suit in a forum which is
oppressive to the defendant. The ground for the decision was the au-
thority of the Miles and Kepner cases, which are admittedly indistinguish-
able from the Pope case.
The value of Miles and Kepner as controlling authority on this issue
appears questionable in view of the Congressional action in enacting the
transfer statute. The Revisor's Note to the transfer statute alludes to the
Kepner case "as an example of the need for such a provision." Yet this
=337 U.S. 55, 69 Sup. Ct. 944 (1949).
^'See discussion on pp. 194-195 supra.
'r340 U.S. 1, 71 Sup. Ct. 1 (1950).
'345 U.S. 379, 73 Sup. Ct. 749 (1953).
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case is followed in apparent direct contradiction to the intent of the legis-
lature. The majority dismissed this argument by concluding that the
reference was made to the Kepner case only "... as an apt example of an
inequitable situation which could be cured by providing the federal courts
with the power to transfer an action on grounds of forum non con-
veniens."29 As was pointed out, however, by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
a well reasoned dissenting opinion, "It is more than difficult to assume
that Congress aimed at the result which this court reached in the Collett
case, and at the same time desired the result of Miles and of Kepner to
continue to be law." 0
The Court also stressed the failure of the Jennings Bill"' in the Senate
Judiciary Committee after it had been passed by the House. This bill
sought to deprive a plaintiff in an action under the FELA of some of
those forums expressly provided by the venue provision of that Act, by
limiting his choice to the place of injury or the state of his residence,
provided, however, that if the defendant could not be served, the action
could be brought in a jurisdiction in which the defendant was doing
business at the time of commencement of the suit. Failure of the bill
evidenced Congress' intent not to deprive a plaintiff of any of the forums
provided by the FELA. It is submitted that a contrary decision in the
Pope case would not have deprived a plaintiff of any of the forums pro-
vided by the FELA. Even if a defendant could enjoin a plaintiff from
suing in a particular forum, the plaintiff could still have his choice of
forums so long as that choice was reasonable and not made for the pur-
pose of harassing the defendant.
Criticism of the Pope case and its effect on the general problems of
venue in FELA cases appears to be forthcoming. In the recent case of
Coffey v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,82 a case factually in line with those un-
der discussion, a Kentucky court of appeals said:
Regardless of whether we think the reasoning in Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's dissenting opinion expresses the sounder view, and regardless of
what our independent views on the question might be, we feel constrained
to follow the decision of the majority of the United States Supreme Court
as expressed in the Pope case!'
CONCLUSION
A plaintiff, if restricted by a narrow venue provision to such a degree
as to compel him either to bring suit in an inconvenient forum or relin-
quish his right to redress, is concededly given only an inequitable choice.
' Id. at 385, 73 Sup. Ct. at 752.
'Id. at 390, 73 Sup. Ct. at 755.
' H.R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
3258 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1953).
'Id. at 501.
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